Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who is not accustomed think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding the pool of examples cannot resolve certain border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence doesn't communicate anything; whether it belongs with the pool of examples remains ambiguous.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted for a Bongard Problem with only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who is not accustomed think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding the pool of examples cannot resolve certain border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence doesn't communicate anything; whether it belongs with the pool of examples remains ambiguous.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who is not accustomed think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding the pool of examples cannot resolve certain border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence doesn't communicate anything; whether it belongs with the pool of examples is ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who is not accustomed think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding the pool of examples does not resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence doesn't communicate anything; whether it belongs with the pool of examples is ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who is not accustomed think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding pools of examples does not resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence doesn't communicate anything; whether it belongs with the pool of examples is ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding pools of examples does not resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence doesn't communicate anything; whether it belongs with the pool of examples is ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding pools of examples does not resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence doesn't communicate anything; whether it belongs with the pool of examples is simply ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding pools of examples does not resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence doesn't communicate anything; whether it should be said to fit in with the pool of examples is simply ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding pools of examples does not resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence isn't a sign of it fitting or not fitting in with the pool of examples; whether it should be said to fit in with the pool of examples is simply ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But expanding pools of examples cannot resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence isn't a sign of it fitting or not fitting in with the pool of examples; whether it should be said to fit in with the pool of examples is simply ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But larger pools of examples cannot resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence isn't a sign of it fitting or not fitting in with the pool of examples; whether it should be said to fit in with the pool of examples is simply ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But larger pools of examples cannot resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence isn't a sign of it fitting or not fitting in with the rest of the examples; whether it should be said to fit in with the rest of the pool of examples is simply ambiguous, up to interpretation.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But larger pools of examples cannot resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence isn't a sign of it fitting or not fitting in with the rest of the examples; whether it should be said to fit in with the rest of the pool of examples is simply ambiguous.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But larger pools of examples cannot resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence isn't a sign of it fitting or not fitting in with the rest of the examples; it is simply ambiguous.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But larger pools of examples cannot resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence isn't a sign of it fitting or not fitting in with the rest of the examples; there is no answer.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are specific notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, the empty square (zero dots) has been left out of BP989. This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem).

(There would be no ambiguity if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

(Whether or not zero seems like an obvious example also has a cultural component (see @culture); someone who has not been trained to think of zero as a number might not see this as ambiguous at all.)

Larger pools of examples make the absence of notable border cases like this more conspicuous and intentional-seeming. (See also discussion at @left-narrow.) But larger pools of examples cannot resolve all ambiguous border cases: if the rule of the Bongard Problem by nature leaves unsorted a potential example that is a border case for even fitting in with the rest of the examples, its absence isn't a sign of it fitting or not fitting in with the rest of the examples.

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are notable cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, it has been left out whether not or an empty square belongs as a relevant example in BP989 (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem). This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem. (This would no longer be ambiguous if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a natural cutoff point.

Sometimes there are clear-cut cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, it has been left out whether not or an empty square belongs as a relevant example in BP989 (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem). This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem. (This would no longer be ambiguous if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?

Left-sorted Bongard Problems are tagged with the keyword "preciseworld" on the OEBP.

The keyword "preciseworld" basically means: if a new Bongard Problem were created to sort whether or not examples fit in the pool of examples in the original Bongard Problem, it would be tagged @precise.

For a Bongard Problem fitting left, the intended class of examples sorted by the Bongard Problem is clear-cut.

For a Bongard Problem fitting right, there isn't any obvious boundary to take as delimiting the pool of potential examples. There is an imprecise fading of relevancy rather than a discrete natural cutoff.

Sometimes there are clear-cut cases of potential examples for which there is ambiguity about whether they belong.

For example, it has been left out whether not or an empty square belongs as a relevant example in BP989 (or any similar dot-counting Bongard Problem). This is perhaps the only obvious example that is ambiguous as to whether it should be considered as belonging to the pool of examples shown in the Bongard Problem. (This would no longer be ambiguous if it were actually included in the Bongard Problem.)

It is tempting to make another another "allsortedworld" analogous to @allsorted. But the pool of relevant examples fitting in a Bongard Problem is like a Bongard Problem with only one side: a collection satisfying some rule. Would there be any difference between @precise and @allsorted if a Bongard Problem had only one side?